Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Börgers, Tilman ; Smith, Doug |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 9.2014, 2, p. 339-360
|
Subject: | Robust mechanism design | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
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