Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Börgers, Tilman ; Smith, Doug |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 9.2014, 2, p. 339-360
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Robust mechanism design | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem |
Type of publication: | Article |
---|---|
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1111 [DOI] 893684090 [GVK] hdl:10419/150223 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1111 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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