Robust predictions in infinite-horizon games : an unrefinable folk theorem
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Weinstein, Jonathan ; Yildiz, Muhamet |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 80.2013, 1, p. 365-394
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics |
-
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
Chassang, Sylvain, (2011)
-
The robustness of incomplete penal codes in repeated interactions
Gossner, Olivier, (2020)
-
Truthful equilibria in dynamic Bayesian games
Hörner, Johannes, (2015)
- More ...
-
Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Yildiz, Muhamet, (2016)
-
Impact of higher-order uncertainty
Weinstein, Jonathan, (2003)
-
Finite-order implications of any equilibrium
Weinstein, Jonathan, (2004)
- More ...