Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Abdulkadiroglu, Atila ; Sonmez, Tayfun ; Unver, M. Utku |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences |
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