Second-Mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition

This paper explores a dynamic model of product innovation, extending the work of Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995). It is shown that if R&D costs for quality improvements are low, the dynamic competition is structured as a race for being the pioneer firm with payoff equalization in equilibrium, but switches to a waiting game with a second-mover advantage in equilibrium if R&D costs are high. Moreover, the second-mover advantage increases monotonically as R&D becomes more costly

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun C. ; Lehmann-Grube, Ulrich
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Wettbewerb \| Competition
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 3, Pp. 419-433, 2001 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114796