Self selection and market power in risk sharing contracts
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Prasad, Kislaya ; Salmon, Tim |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 90.2013, p. 71-86
|
Subject: | Incentive contracts | Principal-agent model | Self-selection | Market power | Experiments | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Marktmacht | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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