Envy-free allocations for budgeted bidders
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kempe, David ; Mu̕alem, Ahuva ; Salek, Mahyar |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : 5th international workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-642-10840-7. - 2009, p. 537-544
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Neid | Envy | Allokation | Allocation | Theorie | Theory |
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