Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Hummel, Patrick |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 96.2012, 3/4, p. 341-348
|
Subject: | Elections | Strategic voting | Multiple candidates | Sequential voting | Simultaneous voting | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Wahlsystem | Electoral system |
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