Signaling honesty: institutional strength and voters' concern about corruption in a model of electoral competition
Marcelo de C.Griebeler, Alexandre R. da Silva
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Griebeler, Marcelo de Carvalho ; Silva, Alexandre R. da |
| Published in: |
Revista brasileira de economia : RBE ; publicação de Fundação Getúlio Vargas. - Rio de Janeiro : Fundação Getúlio Vargas, ISSN 1806-9134, ZDB-ID 2105183-5. - Vol. 74.2020, 3, p. 277-304
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| Subject: | Corruption | incumbencyadvantage | political economy | Korruption | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.5935/0034-7140.20200015 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012416397