Signaling in Political Cycles. How far are you willing to go?
Year of publication: |
2001-07
|
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Authors: | Streb, Jorge M. |
Institutions: | Universidad del CEMA |
Subject: | rational political budget cycles | two-dimensional asymmetric information | signaling | adverse selection | visibility |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo.. - ISSN 1668-4583. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 193 |
Classification: | D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook |
Source: |
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