Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respecting-Improvements Properties
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hirata, Daisuke ; Kasuya, Yusuke ; Okumura, Yasunori |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (95 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 7, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3876865 [DOI] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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