Strategic approval voting in a large electorate
The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.
Year of publication: |
2004-04
|
---|---|
Authors: | Laslier, Jean-François |
Institutions: | Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE) |
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