Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Forges, Françoise ; Renault, Jérôme |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 50.2021, 2, p. 475-502
|
Subject: | Approval | Cheap talk | Sender-receiver game | Participation constraints | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kommunikation | Communication | Signalling | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination |
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