Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2008-11
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á.
Institutions:	Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont
Subject:	Banzhaf index \| Shapley-Shubik index \| a priori voting power \| rational players

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IEHAS Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 0820 22 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242949