Strategic requirements with indifference : single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berga Colom, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 32.2009, 2, p. 275-298
|
Subject: | maskin monotonicity | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Theorie | Theory |
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