Strategic sequential voting
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | González-Díaz, Julio ; Herold, Florian ; Domínguez, Diego |
Publisher: |
Bamberg : Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG) |
Subject: | sequential voting | elections | endogenous timing | strategic timing |
Series: | |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-3-943153-32-3 |
Other identifiers: | 864414196 [GVK] hdl:10419/144609 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bamber:113 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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González-Díaz, Julio, (2016)
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A characterization of the random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems
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