Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Maus, Stefan ; Peters, Hans J. M. ; Storcken, Ton |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 126.2006, 1/2, p. 27-43
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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