Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
Year of publication: |
July 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 176.2018, p. 393-407
|
Subject: | Externalities | General allocation problems | IR-core | Strategy-proofness | Allokation | Allocation | Externer Effekt | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Core | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Strategie | Strategy |
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