Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Svensson, Lars-Gunnar ; Larsson, Bo |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 9.2005, 2, p. 167-190
|
Subject: | Immobilienmarkt | Real estate market | Strategie | Strategy | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game |
-
Arieli, Itai, (2016)
-
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
Ehlers, Lars H., (2018)
-
Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability : strategic voting and strategic nomination
Turnovec, FrantiĊĦek, (2015)
- More ...
-
Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, (2005)
-
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
Larsson, Bo, (2006)
-
Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, (2002)
- More ...