Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Müller, Michael ; Puppe, Clemens |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 11.2023, 1, p. 131-151
|
Subject: | Costly voting | Generalized medians | Participation | Strategy-proofness |
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