Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmelzer, André |
Publisher: |
[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Allokation | Allocation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 p) |
---|---|
Series: | MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2017/13 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 1, 2017 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2997888 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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