Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Messner, Matthias ; Polborn, Mattias |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 35.2007, 2, p. 287-314
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Strategic voting | Runoff rule | Plurality rule | Coalition-proofness | Communication |
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