Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) introduced the notion of self-confirming equilibrium, which is generally less restrictive than Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine also defined a concept of consistency, and claimed in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self-confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive concept, which we call strong consistency. In games with observed deviators, self-confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self-confirming equilibria. Hence, our alternative theorem ensures that despite the counterexample, the corollary of Theorem 4 is still valid. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kamada, Yuichiro |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 78.2010, 2, p. 823-832
|
Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Ambrus, Attila, (2013)
-
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
Calcagno, Riccardo, (2014)
-
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
Kamada, Yuichiro, (2015)
- More ...