Subgame perfect coalition formation
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Leo, Greg ; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ; Wooders, Myrna Holtz |
Published in: |
Dynamic games and applications : DGA. - Boston : Birkhäuser, ISSN 2153-0793, ZDB-ID 2581474-6. - Vol. 13.2023, 2, p. 510-524
|
Subject: | Coalition formation | Mechanism design | Pareto optimality | Sequential proposer game | Subgame perfection | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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