Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Bannister, James W. ; Newman, Harry A. ; Weintrop, Joseph |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 37.2011, 2, p. 127-148
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Subject: | Relative performance evaluation | Agency theory | Compensation committee report | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Theorie | Theory |
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