The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Year of publication: |
2010-03
|
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Authors: | Dreher, Axel ; Klasen, Stephan ; Vreeland, James Raymond ; Werker, Eric |
Institutions: | Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | World Bank | aid effectiveness | political influence | United Nations Security Council |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 4820 46 pages |
Classification: | O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; F35 - Foreign Aid |
Source: |
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
- More ...
-
The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
-
The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
-
The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
- More ...