The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Dreher, Axel ; Klasen, Stephan ; Vreeland, James Raymond ; Werker, Eric |
Publisher: |
Göttingen : Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG) |
Subject: | World Bank | Aid Effectiveness | Political Influence | United Nations Security Council |
Series: | Discussion Papers ; 26 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 782021662 [GVK] hdl:10419/90458 [Handle] RePEc:got:gotcrc:026 [RePEc] |
Classification: | O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; F35 - Foreign Aid |
Source: |
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
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The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
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The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?
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The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
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