The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Dreher, Axel ; Klasen, Stephan ; Raymond, James ; Werker, Eric |
Institutions: | Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (CeGE), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
Subject: | World Bank | Aid Effectiveness | Political Influence | United Nations Security Council |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 97 |
Classification: | O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; F35 - Foreign Aid |
Source: |
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel, (2010)
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Dreher, Axel, (2010)
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
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Geography vs. institutions at the village level
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