The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly

We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less whilemanagerial incentives are milder.

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Year of publication:	2008-10-31
Authors:	Sensarma, Rudra ; Saha, Bibhas
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2008, 28, p. 1-10
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	mixed duopoly

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629874