The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

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Year of publication:	2004-07-28
Authors:	Shubik, Martin
Institutions:	School of Management, Yale University
Subject:	Market game \| strategic market game \| exchange economy \| core \| characteristic function

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Yale School of Management Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178448