The effects of employment protection on the choice of risky projects

Amihai Glazer; Vesa Kanniainen

We consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firm s ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm constrained in firing will prefer a risk-free project over a risky one, but may prefer the riskier of two risky projects.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Glazer, Amihai ; Kanniainen, Vesa
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	project choice \| labor protection \| Theorie \| Theory \| Kündigungsschutz \| Dismissal protection \| Investitionsentscheidung \| Investment decision \| Investitionsrisiko \| Investment risk \| Risiko \| Risk

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (16 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 689
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/75924 [Handle]
Classification:	M13 - Entrepreneurship ; J23 - Employment Determination; Job Creation; Demand for Labor; Self-Employment
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409396