The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects

We consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firm's ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm constrained in firing will prefer a risk-free project over a risky one, but may prefer the riskier of two risky projects

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Glazer, Amihai ; Kanniainen, Vesa
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kündigungsschutz \| Dismissal protection \| Risiko \| Risk \| Investitionsrisiko \| Investment risk \| Investitionsentscheidung \| Investment decision \| Theorie der Unternehmung \| Theory of the firm

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.306300 [DOI]
Classification:	M13 - Entrepreneurship ; J23 - Employment Determination; Job Creation; Demand for Labor; Self-Employment
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320589