The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters : Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership
Year of publication: |
May 2021
|
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Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Furini, Francesco ; Rohrer, Anna V. |
Publisher: |
Graz : Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz |
Subject: | Climate change | mitigation-adaptation game | international environmental agreements | paradox of cooperation | Nash-Cournot versus Stackelberg scenario | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Klimawandel | Welt | World | Duopol | Duopoly | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten) |
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Series: | Graz economics papers : GEP. - Graz, ZDB-ID 2677671-6. - Vol. GEP 2021, 04 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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