The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters : Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership
Michael Finus, Francesco Furini, Anna Viktoria Rohrer
| Year of publication: |
2021
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| Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Furini, Francesco ; Rohrer, Anna Viktoria |
| Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 109.2021, p. 1-22
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| Subject: | Climate change | International environmental agreements | Mitigation-adaptation game | Nash-Cournot versus Stackelberg scenario | Paradox of cooperation | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Klimawandel | Welt | World | Duopol | Duopoly | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102461 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185848