The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Echenique, Federico |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 22.2003, 4, p. 903-905
|
Subject: | Supermodular games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
-
Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
Echenique, Federico, (2003)
-
Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complements are unstable
Echenique, Federico, (2002)
-
Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
Morris, Stephen, (2001)
- More ...
-
Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
Echenique, Federico, (2002)
-
The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers
Chambers, Christopher P., (2015)
-
Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
Echenique, Federico, (2014)
- More ...