The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Leininger, Wolfgang
Publisher:	Dortmund : Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	Sequential all-pay auction \| complete information \| generalized cost \| generalized Stackelberg game

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Series:	Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge ; 06-01
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	612025071 [GVK] hdl:10419/39438 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270834