The hidden cost of raising voters' expectations : reference dependence and politicians' credibility
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
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Authors: | Grillo, Edoardo |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 130.2016, p. 126-143
|
Subject: | Cheap talk | Reference dependence | Loss aversion | Electoral competition | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Politiker | Politicians | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility |
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