The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 113.2019, p. 743-755
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Subject: | Contract theory | Informativeness principle | Principal-agent model | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal ; Konferenzbeitrag ; Conference paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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