The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sertel, Murat R. ; Yilmaz, Bilge |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 16.1999, 4, p. 615-627
|
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
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