The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

Alessio J. G. Brown; Christian Merkl; Dennis Snower

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Brown, Alessio J. G. ; Merkl, Christian ; Snower, Dennis J.
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	minimum wage \| labor market \| employment \| unemployment \| job offer \| job acceptance \| Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Beschäftigungseffekt \| Employment effect

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Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 8 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 4868
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/102240 [Handle]
Classification:	J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J60 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies. General ; J20 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371904