The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

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Year of publication:	2014-06
Authors:	Brown, Alessio J. G. ; Merkl, Christian ; Snower, Dennis J.
Institutions:	Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	job acceptance \| minimum wage \| labor market \| employment \| unemployment \| job offer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IZA Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	published in: Economics Letters, 2014, 124 (3), 389–391. Number 8252 11 pages
Classification:	J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103270