The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Baliga, Sandeep |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 7.2002, 1, p. 17-26
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Subject: | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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