The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Arin, Javier ; Feltkamp, Vincent |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Core |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, Vol 26 No 1, 1997 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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