The potential output gains from using optimal teacher incentives : an illustrative calibration of a hidden action model

Nirav Mehta

This note examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hidden action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra Pradesh, India. Findings suggest that the introduction of optimal individual incentive-pay schemes could result in very large increases in output, about six times the size of the (significant) results obtained in the experiment.

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Year of publication:	August 2017
Authors:	Mehta, Nirav
Publisher:	Munich : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
Subject:	hidden action \| empirical contracts \| teacher incentive pay \| Theorie \| Theory \| Lehrkräfte \| Teaching profession \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Schätzung \| Estimation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. no. 6598
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/171062 [Handle]
Classification:	I20 - Education. General ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J40 - Particular Labor Markets. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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