The potential output gains from using optimal teacher incentives : an illustrative calibration of a hidden action model
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Mehta, Nirav |
Published in: |
Economics of education review. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 0272-7757, ZDB-ID 865180-2. - Vol. 66.2018, p. 67-72
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Subject: | Empirical contracts | Hidden action | Teacher incentive pay | Theorie | Theory | Lehrkräfte | Teaching profession | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Schätzung | Estimation |
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