The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislative system implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the period it takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit of this pre-commitment.<BR><BR>

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001-01-17
Authors:	Frijters, Paul ; Tieman, Alexander F.
Institutions:	Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	time-inconsistency \| legislation \| irreversible investments

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 01-008/3
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450766