The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
Year of publication: |
June 2017
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Authors: | Kellner, Christian |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 21.2017, 2, p. 83-119
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Subject: | Moral hazard | Ambiguity aversion | Optimal contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
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