The Protection of Proprietary Information and Forced CEO Turnover

We examine the effect of protection of proprietary information on forced CEO turnover decisions. Relying on changes in the enforceability of the covenant-not-to-compete, we show that strengthening the protection of proprietary information increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. Such effects are more pronounced when firms face more severe product market threats and operate in industries with greater threats of predatory hiring. Further analyses explore adoptions of UTSA/IDD and reveal consistent results, providing additional support to the argument that better protection on proprietary information enhances the CEO labor market efficiency

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Lin, Yupeng
Other Persons:	Peters, Florian S. (contributor) ; Seo, Hojun (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Arbeitsmobilität \| Labour mobility \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (62 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 8, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3262366 [DOI]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; K12 - Contract Law ; L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior. General ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851176