The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and Italy : an empirical analysis based on agency theory
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mallin, Chris A. ; Melis, Andrea ; Gaia, Silvia |
Published in: |
International business review : the official journal of the European International Business Academy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0969-5931, ZDB-ID 1164338-9. - Vol. 24.2015, 2, p. 175-186
|
Subject: | Agency theory | Corporate governance | Independent non-executive director | Italy | Remuneration | UK | Italien | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vorstand | Executive board | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Großbritannien | United Kingdom |
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