The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Martimort, David ; Stole, Lars
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Signalling \| Allokation \| Allocation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2001 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.287118 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320776